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Uniuersity of Edinburgh Management School, UK
There is growing interest in the manner in which European investors u>e their for-
mal rights and Informal influence as shareholders to encourage conpanies to
improve their management of social, ethical and environmental issues. Shareholder
engagement (or investor activism) has made an important contribution to improve-
ments in corporate responsibility performance. The majority of this enga ;ement has
been conducted on the basis that there is a financial case for companies to improve
their social and environmental performance.
This article considers whether investors are prepared to intervene in situations
where there is no compelling business case for companies to improve their social
and environmental performance and, by extension, no obvious financial reason for
investors to encourage them to do so. The article concludes that, for the vast major-
ity ofcorporate responsibility problems, the new European investor activism con-
tinues to pursue goals that are aligned with investor interests; it does not pursue
public-interest objectives that conflict with investors' financial prioritie >. However,
there is some evidence that, particularly in the case of investor action on climate
change, the time horizon over which investors consider their financial interests may
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I N RECENT YEARS THERE HAS BEEN CROWING INTEREST iN THE MANNER INwhich investors use the formal rights and informal influence granted to them asshareholders to encourage companies to improve their management of social, eth-ical and environmental issues In Europe, a growing number of large institutional
investors are now engaging with companies on these issues.' This has resulted in
growing excitement that institutional investors can play a substantial role in solving cor-
porate responsibility problems, perhaps even displacing the need for government inter-
vention {e.g. Hawleyand Williams 2000; McLaren 2004; Robins 2006}.
There is evidence that shareholder engagement {also commonly referred to as
investor activism) can contribute to improvements in corporate responsibility perfor-
mance (see, for example, the case studies in Sullivan and Mackerizie 2006b: 158-213).
By and large, this engagement has been conducted on the basis that there is a financial
case for companies to improve their social and environmental performance: that is,
where the interests of companies and society are aligned. While such activity may in
itself be worthwhile, it does raise the question of whether investors can play a mean-
ingful role when there are conflicts between the interests of companies and society.
Unfortunately, economic theory suggests that many of the most serious corporate
responsibility probiems result from market failures, where the interests of companies
are not aligned with those of society. In such situations, there is typically no compelling
business case for companies to take action and, by extension, no obvious financial rea-
son for investors to encourage them to do so. If, as a result, investors are unlikely to be
prepared to tackle these difficult cases, the hope that investors may be able to play a
really significant role in addressing corporate responsibility issues may be disappointed.
The aim of this article is to consider whether shareholder engagement can play a
meaningful role in addressing corporate responsibility performance in situations of
market failure.^ The article explores this question by analysing investors' efforts to cor-
rect or, at least, partially remedy the market failures relating to climate change. Climate
change is also used to explore whether and under what conditions investors may be pre-
pared to take action to correct market failures.
What is shareholder activism?
Shareholder activism occurs when shareholders use their unique power as the owners
of companies to facilitate change. The central focus of this activity has been on improv-
ing aspects of corporate governance (Ryan and Dennis 2003) but there is increasing
emphasis on improving the management of specific social or environmental issues. The
reasons for shareholders to take these actions include the belief that well-governed com-
panies will tend to outperform over the longer term, pressure from stakeholders—
clients, beneficiaries, trade unions, non-governmental organisations—for investors to
take a more activist approach to their investments, and governmerit pressure (see, gen-
erally, Sullivan and Mackenzie 2006a: 150-51).
1 A recent survey estimated that some €2,665 billion of assets are now managed according to some
sort of socially responsible investment strategy; approximately half of this is shareholder activism
(Eurosif 2008). Eurosif estimates that this could represent 10-15% of total European funds under
management, although it cautions that care should be taken with this conclusion as the estimates
are based on self-reported data. ,
Z In many respects, this article is an 'insider* account. Both authors have woiked as investor activists
for several years. This piece draws on their direct experience of activism in the UK, and captures their
reflections on the scope and limits of its ability to address coqjorate responsibility problems.
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The Starting point in many discussions around shareholder activism has been the
importance of using the formal rights associated with owning shares, in particular the
right to vote on resolutions at AGMs. In the US, the exercise of these rights in pursuit of
social goals is now well established (Hoffman 1996; Monks et cd. 2004). However,
responsible ownership goes beyond simply exercising voting rights, important though
(his is (Carleton cl al. 1998; Butler and Lee 2004). Institutional investors car. exert influ-
ence through their ability to buy and sell shares and bonds (hence influencing share
price or the cost of capital), through their relationships with company management and
through their ability to exert pressure on companies (e.g. through benchn arking per-
Ibrmance on specific corporate governance or corporate responsibility issues). These
Ibrmal and informal powers mean that investors have significant ability—particularly
if they act collectively—to influence the behaviour of companies.
The potential of investor activism
One way of characterising investor activism on corporate social responsibili y problems
is to distinguish between situations where the goals of activism are broadly aligned with
investors' financial interests and those where the two are in conflict.
To date, most investor activism (in Europe at least) has focused on the fii st category.
This category has been attractive for investors because it allows them to ,ustify their
demands for improved corporate responsibility performance by reference to the
increase in shareholder value that is expected to accrue. That is, there is ar alignment
between the actions of the activist investors and the short- or long-term su^xess of the
business.
There is a growing body of anecdotal evidence that investor activism backed by a 'busi-
ness case" in this way can be etTective in encouraging companies to improve their cor-
porate responsibility performance.^ The experience of activist institutional nvestor.s in
the UK is captured in Sullivan and Mackenzie 2006b in a series of case studii s that illus-
trate where investors have contributed to improvements in the quality of :ompanies'
policies, management systems and disclosures on a range of social, ethic; I and envi-
ronmental issues, including climate change, supply chain labour standaids, human
rights, business ethics and access to medicines. Investors have contributed to these out-
comes through (Sullivan and Mackenzie 2006b: 149-215):
• Facilitating dialogue between companies and stakeholders and/or raising stake-
holder concerns with companies. For example, institutional investors have helped
to raise the profile of human rights issues with companies by supporting specific
NGO campaigns and acting as a conduit for the flow of information between pres-
sure groups and companies
• Legitimising specific debates, by encouraging companies to consider issues such
as equal pay (see, for example Henderson Global Investors 2002) and human rights
3 See, for example, ihe evidence presented by two of the leading activist asset managers in the UK,
Insight investment (www.rnsÍghtinvestment.com/Responsibilily/Ínvestor_responsibil¡ y_jiome.asp,
accessed 17 June 2008) and FSLC Asset ManagemenI (www.fandc.com/new/lnstituti mal/DefauIt.
aspxPid-Sogói). The present authors have first-hand experience of this. Between 2000 and 2007
our organisations engaged with several hundred companies to encourage improvemt nts to corpo-
rate responsibility policy and practice. During this process we have experienced multi,jle instances
in which companies have responded to our requests by making changes to their corp-)r3te respon-
sibility policies or practices, In some cases this has been accompanied by letters from ;enior execu-
tives thanking us for helping them understand how better to manage these issues—"Vidence that
the changes were, at least in part, a result of our activity as investors.
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(see, for example, F&C 2004), as proper matters for corporate attention because of
the risks and opportunities they raise
• Encouraging companies that fall below standards of good practice set by sector lead-
ers to improve their performance. For example, investors have played an important
role in encouraging companies to meet the standards required to allow inclusion
in the FTSE4Good indices, whose criteria are based on industry best-practice stan-
dards I
• Encouraging companies to ensure that corporate governance arrangements are sup-
portive of corporate responsibility, specifically those aspects of corporate responsi-
bility that fall within the proper role of the board: for example, strategic issues such
as tax policy, or aspects of executive incentives
In most of these cases, the arguments for improvements to corporate responsibility were
supported by business-case arguments including: the need to manage potential risks to
corporate brand and reputation; the need to pre-empt, or at least be prepared for, poten-
tial government regulation; and the strategic advantage of being ahead of competitors
on a potentially important business issue.
Why might market failures limit the scope of shareholder activism?
while investors have been able to make persuasive business-case arguments for
improvements to specific aspects of corporate social, ethical or environmental perfor-
mance, economic theory seems to suggest that the overall scope for investors' contri-
bution in this area may be limited. This is because the solutions to many of the most
important corporate responsibility problems conOict with, at least, the short-term fman-
cial interests of investors. In the face of conflicts of this kind, self-interested investors
are more likely to avoid undertaking activism than they are to forgo their financial inter-
ests.
Sources of market failures
80
The economics literature suggests that the fundamental source of conflicts between
investors and society is market failure. It identifies four main types: welfare economics
emphasises externalities and market failures in relation to public goods (see, generally,
Pigou 1920; Coase 1960), while the theory of imperfect competition focuses on the inef-
ficiency of monopoly power and imperfect information {Akerlof 1970). Externalities
occur when the benefits or costs of an exchange spill over onto other parties; negative
(as opposed to positive) externalities occur when the actions of one party impose costs
on another party. An example of a negative externality is climate change, where the costs
of. say, emitting a greenhouse gas such as carbon dioxide into the atmosphere are not
bome by the companies or individuals responsible but by those affected by climate
change and. hence, the price of the good or service may not reflect its complete social
value. If the cost to society of pollution is not included in the cost of producing a good
or service, the firm will produce more than is socially optimal of the good which causes
the pollution. In the presence of such externalities, the market cannot provide the right
price signals to economic agents and, therefore, will fail to maximise social welfare. The
other dimension of welfare economics is market failure in relation to public goods. In
environmental policy, the key issue is the depletion of open access (or common prop-
erty) resources by overuse. This occurs because no one party has the incentive to con-
cern themselves with (i.e. pay for) the effect of their activities on others. Many of the
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most serious corporate responsibility challenges relating to environmental issues arise
wholly or partly because of market failures: issues such as industrial pollution, over-
fishing, deforestation and unsustainable consumption of natural resources ue all exam-
ples of market failures (Cropper and Oates 1992).
The other major sources of market failure relate to imperfect competition, specifi-
cally monopolies and imperfect information. From an economic perspective, monopo-
lies tend to lead to prices being too high and/or the quantity of goods pro<luced being
too low. Tliis market failure is associated with a range of corporate responsibility prob-
lems where consumers are priced out of markets (e.g. where monofroiy pricing means
that people in poor countries cannot afford to buy AIDS medicines (Vacham and Smith
2004) or denied access to new technologies (e.g. some of the antitrust alleijations con-
cerning Microsoft). Finally, informational asymmetries can serve to enabi? producers
to market products that are potentially harmful to consumers, but where tht consumers
are unable to make an informed choice. In the UK, for example, the fman :ial services
sector has repeatedly been affected by corporate responsibility scandals reiulting from
asymmetries of this kind {Financial Services Authority 2004).
Do investors have an interest in correcting market failure?
The fact that many of the most serious corporate responsibility problems appear to result
directly from market failures raises a significant problem for investor acti^  ism on cor-
porate responsibility issues. The problem is that the economics literature suggests that
corporate financial performance should improve when companies successfully exploit
market failure (i.e. exploiting market failure is often the profit-maximising strategy).
This means that, in situations of market failure (and in the absence of the credible
prospect of government or other social intervention), bad social and enviroiimental per-
formance is good for profits. As a result, investment analysts will have ga)d reason to
reward companies for exploiting market failure. This problem is not merel; theoretical.
In practice investors do look for companies that are able to make super-ncrmal profits
because of market failure. For example, equity analysts often look for *pri<.ing power':
that is, the ability to set prices well above the marginal costs of production. One source
of pricing power is uncompetitive markets with high barriers to entry.^  If this argument
is correct, then there will be a large class of serious corporate responsibility problems
where investors will not have a financial interest in undertaking shareholder activism
to attempt to reduce the harmful social, ethical or environmental impacts hat result.
Of course, governments and wider society frequently attempt to impose penalties to
deter companies from exploiting market failure. When such penalties an sufficiently
substantial (i.e. of appropriate magnitude, certainty and effect), companies do not gain
from exploiting market failure and will, all things being equal, be deterrec from doing
so. In such cases, investors will have no interest in companies exploiting th( market fail-
ure and so may be inclined to undertake shareholder activism. However, if the market
failures have already been 'corrected' in this way, the need for activism, at least in the-
ory, disappears. In practice, there is probably still a residual role for investors in mak-
ing sure that companies respond appropriately when a market failure has been
corrected. As the examples of investor activism listed above show, investor sctivism sup-
ported by business-case arguments (i.e. when there is a prima facie case tha t companies
can benefit from taking action) can encourage companies to improve thi ir corporate
responsibility performance.
4 See Mackenzie 2006 for a discussion of some of the implications of this problem foi the practice of
responsible investment.
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But does the conclusion that investors have no interest in acting to discourage com-
panies from exploiting market failure mean that they will not do so in practice? Surely
investors can decide to act responsibly and do the right thing, even ifit is not in their
financial interests? Individual investors, clearly, are completely at liberty to make any
investment decisions that they choose, including explicitly accounting for ethical values
in these decisions. However, the vast majority of invested assets in developed markets
are owned by pension funds and other trusts. These funds are governed by trust law
which typically requires trustees to give priority to the fmancial interests of beneficia-
ries (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 2005). Investor activism to encourage companies
to avoid seeking the profits available from exploiting market failure would therefore be
legally questionable.
Other approaches
We acknowledge that economic theory is not the only possible fraï le of reference here.
An alternative way of analysing corporate responsibility issues is to consider them as
issues of stakeholder concern. The stakeholder perspective challenges the view that a
firm's success is primarily measured by the maximisation of returns to shareholders.
Stakeholder theory argues that, when a company interacts with scjciety, a shared inter-
est and interdependence develops between the company and other social groups and
that this interaction, in turn, leads to the creation ofcorporate stakeholders (i.e. those
groups that are affected by, or can affect, a firm's decisions, policies and operations)
{Post et al. 1996: 8; Halal 2001). These stakeholders include consumers, investors,
financiers, government, industry associations, industry members, regulators, NGOs,
community groups and workers. Stakeholder theory argues that firms should be
expected to accept broader responsibility to balance the interests of shareholders with
those of other groups that are affected by the organisation (Wartick and Wood 1998: 94-
115). In stakeholder theory (Clarkson 1995; Donaldson and Preston 1995; Post et ai.
2002), one ofthe key debates is the manner in which the rights of shareholders versus
the rights of stakeholders should be taken into account in business decision-making
processes.
These normative issues are outside the scope of this article's focus on the incentives
facing investors, and the conflicts that can arise as a result. Stakeholder theory does have
some bearing on the incentives question in its argument that there is a reasonably close
alignment between the interests of shareholders and stakeholders, and that the long-
term financial interests of companies mean that they need to properly consider the inter-
ests of all stakeholders, not just narrow shareholder needs (Nobel 1999: 1,260-63).
However, the proposition that systematic management attention tD stakeholder issues
is critical to an organisation's success has not been robustly tested in the literature.
Have investors engaged in situations of market failure?
While economic theory suggests that investors do not have a financ al
taking investor activism to discourage companies from exploiting




Case study: investor activism on climate change
Climate change has been described as 'the greatest market failure the world has ever
seen' (Stern 2006). The overwhelming scientific consensus is that increasing concen-
trations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, primarily due to the burning of fossil
fuels and land-use change, are causing significant changes in the Earth's climate. This
will have significant impacts on economies, societies and ecosystems owing to direct
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weather-related events such as sea level rise, floods and hurricanes (IPCC 2007). While
climate change is predicted to have significant macroeconomic impacts—for example,
the Stern Review on the economics of climate change suggested that the overall costs
and risks of climate change could be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each
year, now and forever {Stern 2006)—the reality is that policy measures direcied at reduc-
ing the greenhouse gas emissions that are causing global warming are likely to impose
significant costs on many firms, at least over the short term.
Even though climate change represents a colossal market failure, it seems to be receiv-
ing very substantial levels of investor attention on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe,
51 institutional investors—primarily UK and French pension funds and asset man-
agers^—representing around €2.7 trillion in assets under management havt formed the
Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC).'' In the US, the Investor Net-
work on Climate Risk now has 50 members with over US$3 trillion of assets under man-
agement,^ while the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) represents 225 i lternational
institutional investors with assets under management of US$31 trillion.' Does this indi-
cate that the predictions of economic theory are wrong, and that investors cm in fact act
to correct market failures?
So far discussions on the subject of climate change between companies and their
investors have primarily focused on reporting and, to a lesser extent, on ;ncouraging
companies to ensure that climate change is properly integrated into corporjite strategies
and risk management processes. For example, the Carbon Disclosure Project seeks to
improve corporate disclosures, with the aim of informing investors about ¡he risks and
opportunities presented by climate change to companies. Similarly, the Giobal Frame-
work for Climate Risk Disclosure* encourages companies to provide information on cli-
mate change risks and opportunities in a standardised manner that will allow investors
to analyse this data and compare companies. Tlie primary assumptions underpinning
both of these initiatives are that: (a) better reporting will encourage inve.itment man-
agers to better manage the financial risks associated with climate changí ; and (b) the
request for disclosure will signal to companies that investors are concerr ed about cli-
mate change, thereby providing an incentive for companies to reduce theii greenhouse
gas emissions.
Much of the engagement by the individual investment managers and ptinsion funds
has a similar focus, with investors relying on standard business-case arguments to
encourage companies to better manage their greenhouse gas emissions. For example,
as noted in the recent report Mana^ng Investments in a Changing Climate {S\ illivan 2006)
from the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC):
|T]he focus of company engagement needs to move beyond requests for mon' or better
disclosure to (a) encouraging companies to signifícantly reduce their direct ar d indirect
greenhouse gas emissions, |b) ensuring tliat companies have properly integrat-d climate
change risks and opportunities into tlieir business strategies and are properl) prepared
for a 'low carbon" economy, and (c) ensuring that companies support public policy efforts
to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
As yet, investors have not asked companies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions beyond
those that would be justified in financial terms. They are absolutely not calling on com-
panies to make very costly immediate cuts in their greenhouse gas emissions.
The current enthusiasm for this kind of investor activism on climate change does
require that the pessimistic economic view (i.e. that investors will not engage at all on
5 www.iigcc.org (accessed 17 June 2008}.
6 www.incr.com (accessed 17 June 2008). I
7 www.cdproject.net (accessed 17 June 2008).
8 www.ceres.org/Page.aspx?pid-5g3 (accessed 19 November 2008).
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climate change because climate change is a market failure) is modestly qualified. Insti-
tutional investors dearly are prepared to engage with companies on the issue of climate
change, notwithstanding its characteristics as a market failure. However, investors' calls
for companies to improve disclosure, strategy and risk management can all be justified
by reference to relatively conventional business-case arguments. So this qualification
concedes very little ground. This investor action still fits firmly into the category of sit-
uations where the goals of activism are broadly aligned with investors' financial inter-
ests and, as such, is consistent with the pessimistic predictions of economic theory.
However, investor engagement with companies on climate chatige is only part of the
story. In parallel to engagement with companies, some investors have staited to engage
much more forcefully with policy-makers, calling for government action to better reg-
ulate market fauure and to establish a long-term policy framework for internalising the
costs of carbon. This activity would appear to be much more challenging to economic
pessimism. Much of this activity has been under the auspices of the Institutional
Investors Group on Climate Change. The IIGCC was established in 2001 as a forum for
collaboration between pension funds and other institutional investors to address the
investment risks and opportunities associated with climate change (for a detailed
description of the llGCC's work, see Sullivan et al. 2005). llGCC's public policy work is
aimed at encouraging policy-makers to take account of the long-term interests of insti-
tutional investors. IIGCC has made submissions^ to government inquiries and consul-
tations relating to issues such as Phase Ii of tlie EU Emission Trading Scheme, the
inclusion of the aviation sector in the EU Emission Trading Scheme, and EU Action on
Climate Change post-2012. In each of these submissions, IIGCC has emphasised the
importance of policy certainty, the need for long-term policy targets directed at signifi-
cant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, the desirability of extending the use of
economic instruments and incentives, and the need for better corporate disclosures.
IIGCC has also met with key climate change policy-makers to ensure that investors' views
on these issues are clearly heard.
Investor activism to encourage more aggressive public policy interventions on cli-
mate change does not straightforwardly fit with the pessimistic economic analysis. If
successful, this activism will lead governments to intervene to impose significantly
higher costs on carbon-intensive business. Does this provide an example of investors
acting against their own interests.^ If looked at in the context of corporate or business
cost-benefit assessments, the answer appears to be yes, as the logical implication of
ilGCC's work is that, at some point in time, companies will be expected to internalise
the costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions, with consequent negative impli-
cations for costs, profits and asset values. However, the picture is not as clear-cut as the
bald assertion that policy measures directed at internalising the costs of greenhouse gas
emissions will damage investors' financial interests. There are two dimensions to this.
The first relates to the macroeconomic implications of climate chanige. Reports such as
the Stem Review on the economics of climate change (Stern 2006) highlight the very
significant, long-term downside risks associated with inaction on climate change. The
report suggests that, at its most extreme, climate change could send the world economy
into a slump on the scale of the Great Depression following the cras^ of 1929.'*' An eco-
nomic catastrophe on this scale is unlikely to be in the interests of long-term investors
such as pension funds. While carbon taxes or other measures to encourage companies
84
9 See the IIGCC website for a comprehensive listing: www.iigcc.0rg/activities/activity4.aspx (accessed
ly June 2008).
10 It is important to acknowledge that Stem's pessimistic view, while influential, is not uncontrover-
sial. The methodology and assumptions used to develop this conclusion havej been challenged (see,
for example, Nordhaus 2006; Dasgupla 2006).
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to reduce greenhouse gas emissions may impose short-term costs on companies or lead
to certain companies or sectors being economically disadvantaged. there w 11 be signif-
icant economic opportunities.
Overall, therefore, on a macroeconomic basis, the short-term costs sht-uld be out-
weighed by the longer-term economic benefits. For example, the Internati'Hial Energy
Agency (2006) argues that countries could implement a range of measure ; directed at
reducing energy demand growth and greenhouse gas emissions and increasing energy
security, where the benefits of using and producing energy more efficiently ; ignificantly
outweigh the costs incurred. This conclusion is supported by the universal investor argu-
ment (see further Hansen and Lott 1996; Hawley and Williams 2000), which suggests
that the investment strategies of many large investors mean that they are essentially per-
manent shareholders in many of the largest companies in the economy, ai^ d their per-
formance reflects that of the economy as a whole more than the perf jrmance of
individual companies. Hence, the actions tbat may be in the interest of an individual
company—in this particular case, allowing increasing greenhouse gas emissions—may
not be in the long-term interests of the economy as a whole as such emissions may
expose other companies to the physical impacts of climate change.
The second reason why public policy activism on climate change may not conflict
with investors' interests is that well-designed public policy should presen significant
opportunities for companies. Benefits should be realised through, for exanple. identi-
fying new technologies, capturing new markets or reducing the need fi^ r defensive
expenditures (e.g. to respond to increased risks of floods or extreme weathei events). As
an illustration, in a recent report examining the implications of climate cl.ange policy
for electricity utilities, it was noted that:
The characteristics of power sector investments—capital-intensive, long-lived and
involving technologies likely to be strongly affected by future emissions controh—mean
that uncertainties regarding the extent, timing and cost of any controls on emi; sions of
greenhouse gases may hinder electricity utilities' ability to design and implement opti-
mum investment strategies. From a public policy perspective, these investm<'nt deci-
sions can have long-term impacts on the sector's greenhouse gas emissions and policy
uncertainty may lead to electricity companies making sub-optimal investment decisions
(e.g. investing in technologies that potentially run counter to climate jrolicy go.tls) {Sul-
livan and Blyth 2006).
Far from running counter to companies' interests, it is interesting to note that a num-
ber of the major UK electricity utilities have started to make these arguments to gov-
ernment. For example, Centrica has argued that tliat the government shot Id set 'bold'
targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions from 2008 onwards, and RWE has empha-
sised that companies need greater regulatory certainty and transparency regarding the
EU Emission Trading Scheme (Bream and Harvey 2006).
Conclusion
Economic theory provides strong arguments for the limitations to investoi activism in
addressing corporate responsibility issues. Many corporate responsibility problems
arise as a result of market failures. Investors are unlikely to act to correct market fail-
ures because doing so is not their interests; exploiting market failure is a profit-max-
imising strategy. Or so economic theory would seem to pessimistically suggest.
The fact that large numbers of investors are prepared to engage with companies on
the issue of climate change—perhaps the largest market failure of all—woi Id appear to
contradict this pessimistic hypothesis. However, it appears tliat much of t:iis activism
is business case-focused and limited to goals that can be pursued without damage to
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investors' short-term interests. On the other hand, public policy-oriented investor
activism on climate change does appear to contradict the hypothesis that investors will
not pursue activism to correct market failures. However, as the universal investor the-
ory indicates, the scope of investors' interests may be substantially broader and longer
term than the account of market failure provided above would indicate. As large insti-
tutional investors are shareholders in portfolios of companies across the whole econ-
omy, not just single stocks, they may not, over the long term, have an interest in
companies that generate externalities. The central economic assumption that investors
will act in their interests is not overturned; the justification for investor activism to
encourage policy-makers to correct the climate change market failure remains rooted
firmly in self-interest. The overall conclusion that may be drawn from the case study of
investor activism on climate change is that, while new regulations to address climate
change may be damaging to the interests of individual companies, investors may con-
dude that these costs will be outweighed by the benefits they sejcure over the longer
term.
The question remains, however, whether this conclusion can be extended to the full
range of corporate responsibility problems caused by market failure. Is investor public
policy activism on climate change just the precursor to wide-ranging and extensive pub-
lic policy activism by investors across the full range of corporate res¡ponsibility problems
associated with market failures.^  We suspect not. There are some features associated
with climate change that mean that it is uniquely suited to prompting investors to engage
in the public policy process.
Climate change is very high on the political and corporate responsibility agenda.
There are few issues that offer more demanding moral challengeis to the current gen-
eration. But climate change is not quite unique in this respect. Indeed, the fact that mil-
lions of people in poor countries are dying of diseases that would be treatable if a little
more money were invested in medicines for them raises similarly demanding political
and moral challenges. So, while the political and moral significance of climate change
is necessary to prompt the scale of investor activism described above, it is not sufficient.
What is perhaps unique about climate change is the fact that there is probably not
another corporate responsibility issue that gives rise to anything like the same long-term
threat to overall investor assets. While other issues may affect particular sectors, climate
change threatens the overall economy with severely negative economic consequences.
The lack of a parallel public policy campaign on access to medicines in developing coun-
tries is perhaps a case in point. No doubt interventions by rich world governments could
do much to resolve the market failures that deny millions in developing countries access
to medicines. However, the reality is that rich-country investors lack a compelling long-
term financial interest in encouraging government interventions on these issues.
This leads us to reluctantly conclude that, for many corporate responsibility prob-
lems, the pessimistic economic analysis we started out with may well be essentially cor-
rect. That is, so far at least, the new European investor activism continues to pursue
goals that are aligned with investor interests; it does not pursue public-interest objec-
tives that conflict with investors' financial priorities. While there is evidence that investor
activism can make a positive contribution to encouraging improvements in corporate
responsibility performance, institutional investors are unlikely to engage in activism
that conflicts with their financial interests. However, the example of climate change does
seem to indicate that the time horizon over which investors consider their financial inter-
ests may extend rather further than is often assumed.
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